

1 AI-Driven Advanced Decision Management for Intelligent Government Services in Saudi 2 Arabia: A Real-Time, Explainable and Policy-Aware Decisioning Framework for Vision 2030

3

4 **Abstract:**

5 Saudi Arabia's rapid digital transformation creates an opportunity to move government services
6 beyond online transactions toward intelligent, continuously governed decision management. This
7 review examines how artificial intelligence can support real-time public-service decisions while
8 preserving legal consistency, explainability, human responsibility, security, and public value. The
9 paper synthesises research published from 2020 to 2025 on artificial intelligence in public
10 administration, automated decision-making, explainable artificial intelligence, public-sector
11 governance, data documentation, rules-as-code, human oversight, and Saudi digital-government
12 adoption. Rather than treating artificial intelligence as a stand-alone prediction engine, the review
13 develops a policy-aware decisioning perspective in which models, codified rules, eligibility
14 conditions, service priorities, human authorisation, and evidence are orchestrated as one accountable
15 operational system. The synthesis identifies three recurring weaknesses in current practice: technically
16 accurate models may still be unsuitable for administrative decisions; explanations are often designed
17 after decisions rather than as part of the decision process; and policy controls are commonly separated
18 from model operations, creating risks when rules, data, or models change. In response, the paper
19 proposes a conceptual framework for Saudi intelligent government services based on six interacting
20 capabilities: trusted event and case data, real-time decision orchestration, machine-readable policy
21 controls, contextual explanation, risk-based human oversight, and closed-loop monitoring. The
22 framework links every service outcome to the data, model, rule version, rationale, authorisation path,
23 and subsequent appeal or correction. Its purpose is not maximum automation, but controlled decision
24 velocity: decisions should be fast where rules and evidence are stable, and deliberately escalated
25 where rights, ambiguity, novelty, or material consequences require human judgement. The review
26 concludes that policy-aware advanced decision management can strengthen Vision 2030 service
27 ambitions when operational performance and public-law values are engineered together rather than
28 assessed separately after deployment.

29 **Keywords:** artificial intelligence; advanced decision management; digital government; explainable
30 AI; policy-aware systems; public services; Saudi Arabia; Vision 2030

1. Introduction

Digital government increasingly involves more than converting paper procedures into portals. Contemporary public services must detect events, interpret evidence, apply changing rules, prioritise cases, communicate reasons, and learn from outcomes while maintaining accountability. Artificial intelligence can improve classification, forecasting, anomaly detection, language processing, and resource allocation, but public administration cannot evaluate such systems only by predictive accuracy. Government decisions affect entitlements, permissions, payments, inspections, referrals, and access to services; consequently, legality, consistency, contestability, privacy, and human responsibility are part of system quality. Research on public-sector artificial intelligence repeatedly shows that adoption creates tensions between efficiency and values such as fairness, transparency, responsiveness, and accountability [2,5,6,11,14]. Studies of automated administrative decision-making further show that automation can support consistency and speed while simultaneously creating difficult trade-offs when discretion, context, or rights are material [20].

Saudi Arabia is a particularly important setting for this problem because digital transformation and artificial-intelligence assimilation are advancing alongside broad institutional modernisation. Research across Saudi public organisations has identified management alignment, data integrity, infrastructure, cultural and linguistic considerations, and governance as recurring conditions for successful artificial-intelligence assimilation [9]. Saudi managers' willingness to adopt artificial intelligence is also associated with perceived usefulness, impact, trust, security, privacy, transparency, and accountability [24]. At the citizen level, adoption of electronic government services is shaped by digital literacy, infrastructure, policy support, security, privacy, and trust [25], while recent research on Saudi digital public services emphasises usable security and privacy as determinants of confidence in electronic channels [29]. These findings suggest that the next stage of intelligent government cannot be framed simply as adding models to existing workflows. Decision logic, policy authority, explanations, oversight, service operations, and evidence must be integrated.

This paper reviews the literature through the lens of advanced decision management: the coordinated use of data, analytics, machine learning, business rules, policy constraints, workflow orchestration, and feedback to make repeatable operational decisions. The central proposition is that intelligent public services require a policy-aware architecture in which a model is one input to a governed decision rather than the decision itself. This distinction matters because public authorities must be able to identify which rule applied, which evidence was considered, why an outcome followed, who or what authorised it, and how a person can challenge or correct it. Accountability

research warns that algorithmic systems can diffuse responsibility when technical complexity obscures who can answer for an outcome [5]. Public-sector cases also show that organisational and legal institutions may fail to interrogate opaque systems even after errors become visible [21].

The study therefore asks how real-time, explainable and policy-aware decision management can be structured for Saudi intelligent government services. Its aim is to synthesise recent evidence and propose an operational framework that reconciles decision speed with administrative legitimacy. Four objectives guide the review: first, to identify design requirements for real-time artificial-intelligence decisioning in public services; second, to examine how explainability, transparency and human oversight influence trust and accountability; third, to analyse how laws, regulations, policies and eligibility rules can remain authoritative when decisions incorporate adaptive models; and fourth, to derive a lifecycle framework that supports continuous monitoring, appeal, correction and controlled learning. The result is a review-based conceptual contribution rather than an empirical evaluation of a deployed Saudi system.

2. Review Methodology

The review used a structured integrative method designed for an interdisciplinary topic that spans information systems, public administration, artificial intelligence, law, digital government, and Saudi public-sector transformation. The methodological organisation follows the logic of defining information sources, search terms, eligibility criteria, analytical categories, and synthesis before interpreting findings. This approach is appropriate because the research question concerns how multiple technical and institutional literatures can be combined into a coherent decision-management architecture rather than the pooled statistical effect of a single intervention.

Searches were designed around five concept groups: public-sector artificial intelligence and automated administrative decision-making; explainability, transparency, fairness and human oversight; artificial-intelligence governance and accountability; machine-readable policy or rules-as-code; and Saudi digital government, artificial-intelligence adoption and public-service transformation. Priority was given to peer-reviewed literature from 2020 through 2025, supplemented by one policy research paper with a persistent DOI on machine-consumable government rules. Studies were included when they contributed evidence, frameworks or empirical findings relevant to operational decision design; publications outside the date window or without a public-service governance implication were excluded.

93 The synthesis proceeded in three stages. First, each source was coded against the decision
 94 lifecycle: sense, validate, decide, explain, authorise, execute and learn. Second, evidence was grouped
 95 into four control domains: data and model integrity; policy and legal alignment; human and
 96 organisational accountability; and citizen-facing transparency, trust and contestability. Third, these
 97 domains were mapped to Saudi public-service conditions identified in the literature. The review
 98 intentionally distinguishes explanatory evidence from normative claims. For example, experimental
 99 research indicates that explanations can affect perceived trustworthiness [16,19], but this does not
 100 imply that any single explanation format is universally sufficient. Similarly, citizen preferences may
 101 trade transparency against perceived effectiveness in some contexts [17], yet administrative systems
 102 still face independent legal and accountability requirements.

103 Quality appraisal emphasised publication credibility, methodological clarity, relevance to public-
 104 sector decision-making, and DOI traceability. Thirty references were retained. The review targets the
 105 architecture and governance problem implied by advanced decision management rather than every
 106 government artificial-intelligence application, allowing focused comparison of controls used when
 107 algorithms influence administrative outcomes.

108 *Table 1. Review design and analytical scope.*

Review element	Operationalisation
Time window	2020-2025 publications only for the final reference set.
Core domains	Public-sector AI; automated decisions; explainability; AI governance; rules-as-code; Saudi digital government.
Primary inclusion test	Direct contribution to decision design, public-service governance, accountability, trust, policy execution or Saudi implementation context.
Analytical lens	Decision lifecycle: sense, validate, decide, explain, authorise, execute and learn.
Control domains	Data/model integrity; policy/legal alignment; human accountability; citizen transparency and contestability.
Quality checks	Peer-review credibility, methodological clarity, topical relevance and DOI traceability.

110 3. From Predictive Models to Advanced Decision Management

111 Artificial intelligence becomes operationally valuable in government when it is embedded in a
112 decision process. A predictive model may estimate fraud risk, service demand, eligibility likelihood,
113 case urgency, or the probability of an adverse event, but an administrative action normally requires
114 more than a score. The system must identify the relevant service and jurisdiction, verify identity and
115 data sufficiency, apply mandatory rules, recognise exceptions, determine whether discretion is
116 permitted, generate a reason, route higher-risk cases for authorisation, execute the action, and preserve
117 evidence. Studies of public-sector artificial intelligence adoption show that organisational context and
118 absorptive capacity shape whether technical capabilities produce public value [10,14].


119 A real-time decision-management architecture therefore needs event awareness and orchestration.
120 "Real time" should not be interpreted as an instruction to automate every case instantly. It means that
121 the system can respond to an event with the appropriate decision pathway at operational speed. A low-
122 risk request supported by complete data and deterministic policy may be decided automatically; an
123 ambiguous or materially consequential case may be paused, enriched, or escalated. Human-in-the-loop
124 research in government illustrates the practical importance of designing machine assistance around
125 human review instead of treating manual intervention as a failure of automation [4]. Human-machine
126 interaction experiments also warn of automation bias and selective adherence: officials may follow
127 algorithmic advice too readily in some conditions and discount it selectively in others [13].
128 Accordingly, oversight must be engineered through thresholds, role definitions and evidence
129 requirements, not left to informal discretion.

130 Data quality and provenance are the first control layer. Documentation approaches such as
131 datasheets for datasets were developed to expose how data were collected, what populations and
132 purposes they represent, and what limitations accompany reuse [7]. Lifecycle analyses of machine-
133 learning harm show that problems may arise at problem formulation, data collection, measurement,
134 model development, evaluation, deployment and feedback [8]. For government decisioning, these
135 insights imply that the decision record should preserve not only the model version but also the source,
136 timestamp, quality state and permitted use of decisive data. A "trusted data" layer is therefore a
137 governed operational object rather than a generic data lake. Eligibility checks should distinguish
138 verified facts from inferred variables; missingness should be explicit; and sensitive attributes should
139 be controlled according to their legitimate role in the service.

140 Advanced decision management also requires separation between prediction and authority.
141 Machine learning is useful where relationships are probabilistic, complex or high-dimensional, while

142 deterministic rules remain valuable when policy requires a stable, auditable condition. Research
143 comparing automation approaches in public services argues that expert or rule-based systems can
144 remain appropriate where process transparency is essential, and that hybrid designs may be preferable
145 to using machine learning for every step [15]. The rules-as-code literature extends this principle by
146 examining how legal or policy rules can be expressed in machine-consumable form [3,22]. However,
147 codification creates its own risks: text may be mistranslated into software, exceptions may be
148 oversimplified, and implementation logic may become detached from the authoritative legal source.
149 Policy-aware decisioning must therefore preserve links between executable rules and their source
150 provisions, effective dates, interpretations and approval history.

151 Figure 1 conceptualises this architecture. Citizen and business channels produce events and cases
152 that enter a trusted data layer. The central orchestration component combines artificial-intelligence
153 models, explicit rules, eligibility conditions, service priorities and risk thresholds. Policy and legal
154 controls constrain the decision from one side; explainability and human oversight constrain it from the
155 other. The result is a service action with an evidence trail, followed by monitoring, appeal and
156 learning. The feedback path does not permit uncontrolled self-modification. Instead, outcomes inform
157 reviewed changes to data, models, policies and thresholds through governed release processes.



158

159 *Figure 1. Policy-aware real-time decisioning architecture for intelligent government services.*

160 4. Explainability, Transparency and Human Authorisation

161 Explainability is often treated as a technical feature that is added after a model produces a result.
162 For administrative decision management, this is insufficient. Explanations must be generated from the
163 actual decision path, including material data, model contribution, policy rules, exceptions, confidence,
164 and human intervention. The broad explainable-artificial-intelligence literature distinguishes multiple
165 forms of explanation and emphasises that the appropriate technique depends on audience, model and
166 purpose [1]. Public-sector evidence makes the audience issue especially important. Experimental work
167 shows that algorithmic explainability can influence perceived trustworthiness more strongly than
168 merely providing access to information about the system [16]. More recent government-focused
169 research finds that different explanation types can affect perceived accuracy, fairness and
170 trustworthiness differently across decision domains [19]. A single generic explanation template is
171 therefore unlikely to meet every service need.

172 The framework proposed here separates four explanation targets. The citizen-facing explanation
173 states the decision, material reasons, applicable policy basis, important evidence, and route to review.
174 The caseworker explanation provides more diagnostic detail, including confidence, data quality flags,
175 exceptions and comparable rules. The governance explanation supports audit by preserving model,
176 rule, data and workflow versions. The technical explanation supports engineers and validators with
177 feature behaviour, monitoring indicators and error analysis. This layered design avoids two common
178 failures: exposing technical complexity to citizens without meaningful reasons, or giving citizens a
179 simplified message while leaving auditors unable to reconstruct the decision.

180 Transparency must also be paired with contestability. Accountability cannot be achieved solely by
181 publishing a model description if affected persons cannot correct data, question a rule application, or
182 obtain meaningful review. Public-value research shows that failures of fairness and transparency can
183 reduce citizen evaluations of government even when people are not directly affected by a decision
184 [11]. Survey experiments likewise indicate that citizens may regard artificial-intelligence-led
185 government decisions as less trustworthy than human decisions in some settings [12]. At the same
186 time, research on public-sector algorithms suggests that people sometimes prioritise effectiveness over
187 transparency or participation [17]. These findings should not be read as contradictory. They show that
188 trust is context-dependent and that public authorities cannot rely on one attitudinal measure to define
189 acceptable governance. A robust system must provide efficiency, reasons, correction mechanisms and
190 independent accountability together.

Human authorisation should consequently be risk-based. Not every decision needs manual approval, because excessive review can recreate delays that intelligent services are intended to remove. Yet automation level should vary with consequence, uncertainty, discretion and reversibility. High-volume deterministic transactions can be straight-through processed when policy and data are clear. Medium-risk cases can require exception review only when thresholds are triggered. High-impact or contested decisions should require accountable human authorisation before final adverse action, particularly when the model contributes a probabilistic assessment rather than a legally sufficient fact. Human reviewers should see both the recommendation and the evidence needed to challenge it; otherwise, the interface can convert oversight into ceremonial confirmation.

The authorisation design must also guard against organisational blackboxing. Case research demonstrates that errors can persist when agencies and oversight institutions defer to automated systems or fail to examine how a system actually produced decisions [21]. Accountability scholarship similarly emphasises that complex algorithmic systems can weaken answerability if responsibility is fragmented among vendors, data owners, developers and public officials [5]. The decision framework therefore assigns named ownership to policy rules, data products, models, service workflows and final authorisation. Escalations, overrides and appeals become analysable events. This converts "human in the loop" from a slogan into an observable governance mechanism.

5. Policy-Aware Decisioning and the Saudi Government Context

Policy awareness is the feature that distinguishes a government decision-management system from a generic artificial-intelligence platform. Public services operate within legal and administrative authority. A model may identify patterns, but it should not silently redefine eligibility, create new sanctions, or alter the meaning of a regulation. Machine-readable policy can improve consistency and speed when rules are explicit, versioned and linked to authoritative sources. The rules-as-code literature describes the potential for governments to produce machine-consumable representations of rules [3], while legal analysis cautions that software implementation can threaten reviewability if code obscures interpretation or departs from legal meaning [22]. These perspectives support a dual representation: human-readable policy remains authoritative, while executable rules are controlled artefacts derived from it.

The decision engine should therefore apply policy through a versioned policy service. Each rule object needs an identifier, source reference, effective period, owner, approval record, test cases, dependencies and interpretation notes. When policy changes, affected services can be identified before deployment. Historical decisions remain reproducible because the system retains the version that was

active at the decision time. This is particularly important for retrospective audit, appeals and compensation where a later rule must not be projected backward. Policy tests should include ordinary cases, boundary values, exceptions and conflict scenarios. Models should be tested against policy constraints so that a statistically plausible output cannot authorise an impermissible action.

Saudi public-sector evidence indicates why this integration matters. Studies of artificial-intelligence assimilation in Saudi public organisations identify misalignment between artificial intelligence and management decision-making, data integrity and sharing, infrastructure, national culture and language, and ethics and governance as significant challenges [9,18]. These are not separate implementation issues; they interact within the decision pathway. Weak data sharing can reduce model validity, while a model that cannot handle Arabic language variation may distort service triage. Management misalignment can result in technically successful pilots that do not fit administrative authority. Governance concerns intensify if models are acquired or developed without a clear relationship to accountable service owners.

Manager adoption research in Saudi Arabia further shows that perceived impact and usefulness influence intentions to adopt artificial intelligence, while transparency, privacy, security and related ethical considerations shape trust [24]. Citizen-focused e-government research identifies similar conditions around security, infrastructure, literacy and trust [25]. Recent Saudi public-service research specifically emphasises that security controls must remain usable because overly burdensome protections can themselves undermine digital-service adoption [29]. A policy-aware architecture can address these factors by making compliance and trust mechanisms part of the transaction flow rather than additional documents around the system. Identity assurance, consent or lawful-use controls, data minimisation, explanation, security checks and escalation can be executed as decision components.

Saudi governance scholarship also places artificial intelligence within wider institutional change [23]. For this review, the relevant implication is that technological capability must be matched by formal roles, review powers and organisational learning. Vision 2030-oriented service modernisation is strengthened when agencies can reuse common decision controls without centralising all discretion into one opaque platform. Shared components can include identity, data quality, policy registries, model governance, explanation services, audit logging and monitoring, while domain agencies retain responsibility for the substantive rules and decisions within their mandates. This federated pattern supports interoperability without erasing institutional accountability.

Table 2. Decision-management control domains, risks and required evidence.

Control domain	Principal risk	Required evidence/control
Trusted data	Incorrect, stale or unlawfully reused information	Source, timestamp, quality state, permitted use, missingness and provenance.
Models	Drift, bias, miscalibration or use outside approved purpose	Model version, validation scope, confidence, fairness checks, monitoring and change approval.
Policy rules	Outdated or mistranslated requirements	Source provision, rule version, effective dates, owner, tests, exceptions and interpretation notes.
Human oversight	Automation bias or ceremonial review	Risk thresholds, accountable role, escalation triggers, override reason and authorisation record.
Explanation	Opaque or misleading reasons	Audience-specific reason, material evidence, policy basis, uncertainty and review route.
Execution and learning	Irreversible action or uncontrolled adaptation	Reversibility, appeal status, outcome monitoring, controlled retraining and release governance.

254

255 6. A Real-Time, Explainable and Policy-Aware Framework

256 The proposed framework consists of six capabilities that operate as one governed decision system.
257 The first is event and case intelligence. Government interactions arrive through portals, mobile
258 applications, contact centres, sensors, partner systems and scheduled processes. Each event is
259 converted into a case context containing identity, purpose, jurisdiction, service type, verified facts,
260 relevant history and data-quality indicators. The second capability is decision orchestration.
261 Orchestration determines which models, rules, validations and human steps are required for the
262 specific service and risk level. It also controls sequencing.

263 The third capability is policy execution. This layer contains versioned rules, thresholds,
264 permissions and exceptions derived from approved policy. It must support effective dates and conflict


265 resolution while retaining human-readable links. The fourth is model intelligence: machine-learning or
266 statistical components used for forecasting, classification, ranking, anomaly detection or natural-
267 language processing. Models are treated as governed assets with approved purposes, training lineage,
268 performance bounds, fairness checks and monitoring requirements. The fifth capability is
269 explainability and human authorisation. Depending on risk, the system either completes the service,
270 requests additional evidence, routes to an authorised officer, or issues a provisional outcome pending
271 review. The sixth capability is evidence and learning, which records the full decision trace and
272 monitors outcomes, appeals, overrides, drift, service times and residual errors.

273 Figure 2 expresses the framework as a lifecycle rather than a one-time model deployment. The
274 system senses an event, validates identity and evidence, decides using models and rules, explains the
275 proposed outcome, authorises according to risk, executes the service action, and learns from
276 subsequent outcomes. Three control layers remain active throughout: policy and rule versions; data,
277 model and decision evidence; and public-value and service metrics. This lifecycle reflects responsible-
278 governance research that emphasises governance across the artificial-intelligence lifecycle rather than
279 only at initial approval [26-28]. Empirical research on how public organisations implement artificial-
280 intelligence governance likewise finds that training, standards, organisational processes and
281 governance practices determine whether ethical principles are translated into operational behaviour
282 [27,30].

283 Real-time operation requires predefined service-level controls. Latency should be measured
284 separately from deliberation. The objective is not the lowest possible response time but the shortest
285 justified path. A low-risk renewal may have a sub-second machine decision; a complex entitlement
286 case may have real-time triage followed by deliberate review. Decision latency metrics should
287 therefore be paired with outcome quality, explanation completeness, override rate, appeal rate, policy
288 exceptions, drift and fairness indicators. This prevents teams from optimising speed while silently
289 transferring risk to citizens or caseworkers.

290 The framework also treats monitoring as a decision function. Model drift is only one form of
291 change. Policy amendments, data-source changes, integration failures, new fraud patterns, seasonal
292 demand, demographic shifts and operational workarounds can alter decision behaviour even when a
293 model remains statistically stable. Monitoring must therefore compare technical, legal and service
294 signals. A rise in overrides may indicate poor model calibration, unclear policy or a new case pattern.
295 A rise in appeals may indicate explanation failure, data quality problems or inconsistent application.
296 Decision records should support root-cause analysis across these layers.

297 Finally, learning is controlled rather than automatic. Production outcomes may improve future
298 models, but retraining should pass through data review, policy checks, validation and authorisation.
299 Direct online learning is inappropriate where a model could change the practical standard applied to
300 citizens without review. Responsible artificial-intelligence governance literature increasingly
301 distinguishes principles from the organisational practices needed to operationalise them [26,28]. The
302 framework follows this distinction: fairness, transparency and accountability are translated into
303 versioning, ownership, testing, escalation, evidence preservation and reviewable change.



304
305 *Figure 2. Governed real-time decision lifecycle with continuous evidence and public-value controls.*

306 **7. Critical Synthesis and Research Agenda**

307 The literature suggests that intelligent government decisioning should be evaluated as a
308 sociotechnical institution, not a software feature. Governance studies consistently identify the need to
309 specify who governs, what is governed, when governance occurs and how controls are implemented
310 [26]. Public-organisation evidence shows that governance becomes more mature when agencies train
311 decision-makers, developers and users and embed standards into operating processes [27]. In practical
312 terms, an advanced decision platform cannot compensate for unclear authority. Saudi agencies
313 adopting a shared framework would still need explicit owners for service policy, data products,
314 models, citizen communications, security and final administrative responsibility.

315 A second research priority concerns explanation quality. Current studies demonstrate that
316 explanations can influence trust and fairness perceptions, but effects vary by domain and explanation
317 type [16,19]. Future Saudi research should therefore test explanations in actual service contexts and in
318 Arabic as well as English, distinguishing informational explanations from legally sufficient reasons.
319 Measures should include comprehension, ability to identify an error, perceived fairness, successful
320 appeal navigation, and caseworker diagnostic value. Explanation research should also test adverse and
321 favourable decisions separately because citizens may scrutinise them differently.

322 Third, policy-aware artificial intelligence needs stronger methods for semantic traceability.
323 Machine-readable rules can make services faster and more consistent, yet legal analysis warns that
324 software can harden one interpretation or obscure how discretionary concepts are operationalised [22].
325 Research should investigate governance patterns in which policy experts and engineers jointly
326 maintain executable rules, with automated comparison between source text, rule versions and test
327 cases. The objective is not to convert all law into code, but to make the parts that are operationalised
328 in digital services visible, testable and reviewable.

329 Fourth, human oversight requires empirical calibration. Human involvement can protect against
330 errors but also introduce inconsistency, delay or automation bias [13]. Agencies need evidence about
331 which decisions benefit from mandatory authorisation, which are better managed through exception
332 review, and which can be safely automated. Experiments and field studies should compare thresholds
333 using service quality, error severity, fairness, workload, review time and appeal outcomes. The
334 appropriate oversight model will vary by domain; therefore, a national architecture should support
335 configurable controls rather than a single automation rule.

336 Fifth, public-value monitoring should be expanded beyond technical performance. Automated
337 decision-making literature shows that good governance involves trade-offs among efficiency, equality,
338 fairness, resilience, responsiveness, privacy, rule of law and transparency [20]. A production
339 dashboard that reports only accuracy and latency is consequently incomplete. Future work should
340 define auditable measures for decision reversibility, explanation coverage, unresolved appeals,
341 distributional error, policy exceptions, human override, and time to correction. These measures can
342 reveal whether performance improvements are accompanied by hidden governance costs.

343 The resulting research agenda is directly aligned with the paper's title. "Advanced decision
344 management" should be investigated as the integration point between artificial-intelligence
345 engineering and public administration. "Real-time" should be studied as controlled responsiveness, not
346 unqualified automation. "Explainable" should mean reasons that fit the recipient and the

administrative purpose. "Policy-aware" should mean that legal and policy authority is explicitly represented and versioned. Saudi research on artificial-intelligence assimilation, manager adoption, citizen e-government use and digital-service security already provides an empirical base [9,24,25,29]. The next step is to connect those studies to operational decision-system design and evaluation.

8. Limitations

This review has four limitations. First, it is an integrative synthesis rather than an exhaustive census of every publication on artificial intelligence in government. The selected literature was intentionally bounded around decision management, explainability, governance, policy representation and Saudi digital government. Second, the evidence base is heterogeneous: it includes conceptual work, reviews, experiments, case studies and technical-governance research, so findings cannot be interpreted as a single causal effect. Third, several influential public-sector studies come from jurisdictions with legal and administrative traditions different from Saudi Arabia. Their mechanisms are useful for design reasoning, but local validation remains necessary. Fourth, the proposed framework is conceptual. It has not yet been tested against service-level outcomes, appeals, caseworker behaviour, Arabic-language explanation quality, or cross-agency interoperability. These limitations define priorities for empirical evaluation rather than weakening the need for integrated governance.

9. Conclusion

Artificial intelligence can make Saudi government services more responsive, predictive and personalised, but only if decision speed is matched by visible authority and reviewable evidence. The literature shows that public-sector artificial intelligence creates value and tension at the same time: automation can increase efficiency and consistency while raising questions about fairness, transparency, responsibility, privacy and the rule of law [5,14,20]. Saudi studies add practical constraints around data integrity, infrastructure, management alignment, security, trust, culture and organisational readiness [9,24,25,29]. These findings support a shift from model-centric projects toward governed advanced decision management.

The framework developed in this review positions trusted data, policy rules, artificial-intelligence models, explanations, human authorisation and monitoring inside one lifecycle. Every outcome should be reconstructable from the evidence, model, rule version, rationale and authorisation path that existed at the decision time. Automation should expand where policy is deterministic and consequences are limited, while uncertainty, discretion and material adverse effects should trigger additional evidence or

accountable human review. Appeals and corrections should feed monitored learning, but changes to models or policy logic should remain controlled releases rather than invisible adaptation.

For Vision 2030, the strategic opportunity is therefore not simply to automate more decisions. It is to build a reusable decisioning capability that allows government entities to deliver faster services without separating innovation from administrative legitimacy. A real-time, explainable and policy-aware architecture can provide that bridge. Its success should be measured by service performance and by the ability of citizens, officials, auditors and courts to understand, challenge and correct decisions when necessary. In intelligent government, the strongest system is not the one that removes humans from the process; it is the one that makes the relationship among data, models, policy and accountable human authority explicit enough to support both speed and trust.

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