

# 1 THE AI PARADOX IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW.

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## 4 Abstract

5 Artificial Intelligence (AI) has evolved from an assistive technology into an autonomous  
6 generator of content, thereby challenging the human-centric foundations of intellectual property  
7 (IP) law. While copyright law is premised on human authorship and originality, trademark law is  
8 rooted in consumer perception and brand distinctiveness. Generative AI disrupts both by  
9 producing creative outputs and replicating brand identities at scale. This paper examines the dual  
10 impact of AI on copyright particularly authorship and training data and trademark law, especially  
11 in relation to brand dilution and deepfakes. Adopting a comparative perspective across India, the  
12 United States, and the European Union, the paper highlights doctrinal gaps, emerging 2026 legal  
13 developments, and proposes a hybrid regulatory framework combining licensing, traceability,  
14 and algorithmic accountability.

## 15 I. Introduction

16 The emergence of generative AI represents a paradigm shift in the field of intellectual property  
17 law. Unlike traditional tools, AI systems autonomously generate text, images, music, and  
18 commercial designs by learning patterns from massive datasets. This capability disrupts  
19 foundational assumptions of IP law, which historically link legal protection to human creativity,  
20 intention, and accountability. The central paradox is evident: AI requires access to existing  
21 protected works for training, yet such access may itself constitute infringement. This tension  
22 necessitates a re-evaluation of traditional doctrines governing authorship, infringement, and  
23 liability.

## 24 II. AI and Copyright: The Battle for Creative Control

### 25 1. The Human Authorship Threshold

26 Copyright law traditionally requires that a work originate from a human author and exhibit a  
27 minimal degree of creativity. This principle has been reaffirmed in *Thaler v. Perlmutter*, where  
28 the court held that works generated entirely by AI without human intervention are not eligible for  
29 copyright protection.<sup>1</sup> The U.S. Copyright Office has further clarified that only human  
30 contributions within AI-assisted works may be protected.<sup>2</sup>

31 In India, the Copyright Act, 1957 does not explicitly address AI-generated works, but its  
32 provisions assume human authorship.<sup>3</sup> Judicial interpretation in *Eastern Book Co. v. D.B. Modak*  
33 established a “modicum of creativity” standard, which may allow recognition of human  
34 contributions in AI-assisted outputs.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, a hybrid authorship model is emerging,  
35 wherein human users may claim authorship if they exercise sufficient creative control over AI-  
36 generated outputs.

## 37 **2. Training Data and the Fair Use Conflict**

38 AI systems are trained using vast datasets that often include copyrighted material, raising  
39 concerns of input infringement. In the United States, this issue is analyzed under the fair use  
40 doctrine.<sup>5</sup> In *Silverman v. Meta Platforms, Inc.*, courts considered whether AI training constitutes  
41 transformative use and whether it harms the market for original works.<sup>6</sup> While early rulings  
42 favored technological innovation, recent developments emphasize the economic rights of  
43 creators and the need for compensation frameworks.

44 The European Union adopts a statutory approach through Text and Data Mining (TDM)  
45 exceptions under Directive (EU) 2019/790, allowing AI training subject to certain safeguards.<sup>7</sup>  
46 Meanwhile, the UK is considering a compulsory licensing model requiring AI developers to  
47 compensate rights holders.<sup>8</sup> India, however, lacks explicit provisions, creating legal uncertainty  
48 regarding the permissibility of AI training under existing fair dealing provisions.

## 49 **3. Output-Based Infringement**

50 Even where training is lawful, AI outputs may infringe copyright by reproducing or closely  
51 imitating protected works. Courts apply the substantial similarity test, which becomes complex  
52 in the AI context due to the opacity of training datasets. This raises concerns about derivative

53 works and unauthorized adaptation, particularly where AI outputs compete with original  
54 creations.

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### 56 **III. Copyright Beyond Authorship: Emerging 2026 Doctrines**

#### 57 **1. Prompt Engineering as Creative Control**

58 A significant development in 2026 is the recognition of prompt engineering as a potential form  
59 of creative authorship. Where users engage in iterative prompting refining outputs through  
60 multiple stages their contribution may amount to creative direction sufficient for copyright  
61 protection.<sup>9</sup> Courts are increasingly considering “human-to-AI contribution ratios” to assess  
62 whether the human user has exercised meaningful control over expressive elements.<sup>10</sup>

#### 63 **2. The De Minimis Defense in AI Training**

64 Technology companies argue that AI training constitutes de minimis copying because models  
65 store only statistical representations rather than actual text.<sup>11</sup> However, critics contend that such  
66 use remains unauthorized and enables derivative outputs, thereby conflicting with creators’  
67 rights.<sup>12</sup> This debate reflects a broader tension between technological abstraction and legal  
68 formalism.

#### 69 **3. Moral Rights and Style Protection**

70 The ability of AI to replicate artistic styles has led to calls for recognizing synthetic moral rights.  
71 Under the Copyright Act, 1957, authors have the right to protect their work from distortion.<sup>13</sup>  
72 Artists argue that AI-generated imitations of their style may violate this right by distorting their  
73 creative identity.<sup>14</sup> This challenges the traditional exclusion of “style” from copyright protection.

### 74 **IV. AI and Trademark: Protecting Brand Integrity**

#### 75 **1. Likelihood of Confusion in AI Outputs**

76 AI-generated logos and branding elements may closely resemble existing trademarks, leading to  
77 consumer confusion. Courts apply the likelihood of confusion test, as established in \*Cadila  
78 Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd.\*<sup>15</sup> Even if AI-generated works lack copyright  
79 protection, they may still infringe trademark rights if they dilute brand identity.

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## 81 **2. Post-Sale Confusion in the AI Era**

82 The doctrine of post-sale confusion has gained importance in the AI context, particularly with  
83 the rise of high-quality “dupes.” When AI systems generate products resembling luxury brands  
84 such as Hermès, third parties may mistakenly associate them with the original brand, thereby  
85 diluting its exclusivity.<sup>16</sup>

## 86 **3. Algorithmic Search and Initial Interest Confusion**

87 AI-powered recommendation systems may divert consumers by suggesting competing products  
88 when users search for specific trademarks. This constitutes a modern form of initial interest  
89 confusion, as recognized in \*Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment  
90 Corp.\*<sup>17</sup> The opacity of algorithmic decision-making complicates liability, raising questions  
91 about developer responsibility.

## 92 **4. Deepfakes and Misrepresentation**

93 AI-generated deepfakes can falsely associate brands or individuals with products, leading to  
94 trademark infringement and personality rights violations. India’s 2026 regulatory framework  
95 under the Information Technology Act, 2000 mandates rapid takedown and watermarking  
96 requirements to address such risks.<sup>18</sup>

## 97 **V. Liability and Enforcement Challenges**

### 98 **1. Contributory vs. Direct Liability**

99 Liability in AI-related infringement cases is complex due to multiple actors. In *Cox*  
100 *Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment*, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed  
101 contributory liability, holding that platforms are liable only if they actively induce infringement  
102 or lack substantial non-infringing uses.<sup>19</sup> This significantly limits platform liability while  
103 increasing the burden on rights holders.

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## 105 **2. Safe Harbor 2.0**

106 Traditional safe harbour protections under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000  
107 are being reconsidered, as AI platforms actively generate content rather than merely hosting it.<sup>20</sup>  
108 The concept of Safe Harbor 2.0 suggests that immunity may depend on whether platforms  
109 implement adequate safeguards against infringement.

## 110 **3. The Right to be Un-trained**

111 A novel doctrine emerging in 2026 is the right to be un-trained, which allows individuals to  
112 demand removal of their data from AI models. Inspired by the GDPR's right to be forgotten.<sup>21</sup>  
113 this concept raises technical challenges, as removing data from trained models often requires  
114 retraining.<sup>22</sup> The doctrine reflects a growing emphasis on post-training accountability.

## 115 **VI. Conclusion**

116 The AI paradox highlights a fundamental conflict between innovation and legal protection.  
117 While AI systems rely on access to data for development, such access may undermine the rights  
118 of creators and trademark holders. Traditional IP frameworks, grounded in human authorship and  
119 intent, are ill-equipped to address the realities of autonomous content generation.

120 To resolve this paradox, a hybrid regulatory framework is required, incorporating compulsory  
121 licensing, enhanced transparency, and algorithmic accountability. Such an approach would  
122 ensure that AI innovation continues while preserving the economic and moral rights of creators.  
123 Ultimately, the evolution of IP law in the AI era will determine whether legal systems can adapt  
124 to technological change without compromising fundamental principles of justice and fairness.

126 **Endnotes:**

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