

# 1       **Post-Soviet Environmental Governance: Institutional Gaps and Policy**

## 2                               **Failures in Central Asia**

### 3       **Abstract**

4       The dissolution of the Soviet Union marked a critical turning point in environmental  
5       governance across Central Asia. This paper examines how post-Soviet institutional  
6       fragmentation, weak regulatory frameworks, and uneven policy transitions have contributed  
7       to persistent environmental degradation in Central Asia. The region - situated between the  
8       Amu Darya and Syr Darya river basins and bordered by the Caspian Sea and the shrinking  
9       Aral Sea - possesses abundant yet unevenly distributed natural resources, including  
10      hydrocarbons, minerals, and glacial freshwater reserves. However, water has emerged as the  
11      most conflict-prone and strategically significant resource. Soviet-era ecological exploitation,  
12      particularly unsustainable irrigation and monoculture practices, laid the foundation for  
13      contemporary crises. In the post-independence period, institutional gaps, limited regional  
14      coordination, and governance deficits have hindered effective environmental protection and  
15      climate adaptation.

16     Climate change intensifies these vulnerabilities through glacier retreat, desertification,  
17     declining agricultural productivity, and worsening public health outcomes. The pollution of  
18     the Caspian Sea and the near-collapse of the Aral Sea exemplify policy failures and weak  
19     enforcement mechanisms. This study argues that environmental degradation in Central Asia  
20     is not merely an ecological issue but a multidimensional security challenge shaped by  
21     governance weaknesses and fragmented regional cooperation. By analysing institutional  
22     structures, policy implementation gaps, and regional dynamics, the paper situates Central  
23     Asia within broader debates on environmental security and post-socialist governance  
24     transitions, offering pathways toward integrated and resilient environmental governance.

25     **Keywords:** Central Asia; Environmental Governance; Post-Soviet Transition; Water  
26     Security; Climate Change; Institutional Gaps

### 29      **Introduction**

30 Central Asia occupies a distinctive geopolitical and ecological space, marked by abundant yet  
31 unevenly distributed natural resources(Kumar D. H., 2015). Stretching between the Amu  
32 Darya and Syr Darya river systems and bordered by the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, the  
33 region is predominantly arid and semi-arid, where water constitutes the most critical and  
34 contested resource. Despite vast reserves of hydrocarbons - particularly in Kazakhstan,  
35 Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan - freshwater scarcity defines the environmental reality of the  
36 region. In countries such as Kazakhstan, water withdrawal rates have surpassed 40 percent of  
37 available supplies, indicating acute water stress. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan  
38 depend heavily on glacier-fed water sources, which are increasingly vulnerable to climate  
39 change.

40 The ecological fragility of Central Asia is inseparable from its historical political economy.  
41 During the Soviet era, centralized agricultural planning converted the region into a major  
42 cotton-producing zone through extensive irrigation projects. This model, especially dominant  
43 in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, prioritized output over sustainability and dramatically  
44 altered natural hydrological systems. The diversion of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers  
45 for irrigation stands as the most consequential example of this transformation. Prior to the  
46 1960s, approximately 55 billion cubic meters of water flowed annually into the Aral Sea; by  
47 2000, this figure had fallen to roughly 1.5 billion cubic meters. The result was one of the  
48 gravest ecological disasters of the twentieth century: the Aral Sea shrank to nearly a quarter  
49 of its original size, devastating surrounding ecosystems and livelihoods(Kumar, 2021, p. 91).  
50 Regions such as Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan witnessed rising mortality rates, declining life  
51 expectancy, and widespread public health crises linked to environmental degradation.

52 The environmental consequences inherited at independence in 1991 were profound. The  
53 newly sovereign republics - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and  
54 Uzbekistan - emerged from the Soviet collapse with degraded ecosystems, aging  
55 infrastructure, and fragmented governance mechanisms ill-suited for cooperative water  
56 management. Although political authority largely remained in the hands of former Soviet-era  
57 elites, the institutional framework that had previously coordinated resource allocation across  
58 republics disintegrated(Kumar, H., 2024, p. 2). This created significant governance gaps,  
59 particularly in transboundary water management, where upstream and downstream interests  
60 often diverged.

61 Environmental degradation in Central Asia extends beyond ecological loss; it intersects  
62 directly with human security, economic stability, and regional politics. Water disputes, energy  
63 dependence, migration flows, and food insecurity illustrate the multidimensional nature of  
64 environmental challenges. In desert and semi-desert contexts, where water is indispensable  
65 for agricultural survival, scarcity carries immediate socio-economic implications. The Aral  
66 Sea crisis further exemplifies how environmental mismanagement can generate long-term  
67 health emergencies, including respiratory illnesses, contaminated water supplies, and  
68 declining agricultural productivity. Moreover, climate change has intensified existing  
69 vulnerabilities. Melting glaciers in the mountainous upstream states threaten long-term water  
70 availability, while rising temperatures accelerate desertification and soil salinization. The  
71 heavily polluted Caspian Sea adds another layer of environmental concern, particularly given  
72 the expansion of hydrocarbon extraction.

73 Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the region also attracted renewed international  
74 attention due to its strategic location and substantial oil and gas reserves (Kumar D. H., 2023,  
75 p. 115). However, resource wealth has not translated into effective environmental  
76 governance. Instead, institutional fragmentation, limited regional cooperation, and competing  
77 national priorities have constrained sustainable policy responses.

78 In this context, post-Soviet environmental governance in Central Asia must be understood as  
79 a complex interplay of historical legacies, institutional weaknesses, and emerging climate  
80 pressures. The environmental crisis confronting the region is not merely a matter of  
81 ecological decline; it represents a structural challenge rooted in governance deficits and  
82 policy failures that continue to shape the trajectory of sustainable development in Central  
83 Asia.

#### 84 **Review of Literature**

85 The concept of environmental security brings together two deeply contested and analytically  
86 complex notions - security and environment. Because both terms carry diverse meanings  
87 across disciplines, their convergence has generated extensive debate and multiple  
88 interpretations (Matthew, A. Richard et al, 2010, p. 5). The interaction between ecological  
89 change and questions of safety, survival, and stability has therefore emerged as a significant  
90 area of scholarly inquiry. Historically, concerns regarding the relationship among population  
91 growth, environmental degradation, and conflict can be traced back to early political  
92 economy. In his essay on the *Principle of Population*, Thomas Malthus argued that “the

93 power of population is indefinitely greater than the power of the earth to produce subsistence  
94 for man.” He maintained that the imbalance between food supply and demographic expansion  
95 would inevitably result in famine, disease, and war. More than a century later, Fairfield  
96 Osborn revived similar anxieties by questioning when it would be acknowledged that  
97 aggressive national policies and international discord could be linked to diminishing  
98 productive land and rising population pressures. Such reflections laid the intellectual  
99 foundation for later debates connecting environmental stress to instability. By the 1960s,  
100 environmental degradation had become a visible global concern, and scholars increasingly  
101 examined its political and social consequences. Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring* (1962) marked  
102 a turning point by drawing attention to the destructive effects of pollution and catalysing  
103 environmental movements worldwide. Although environmental awareness gained momentum  
104 during this period, the systematic linkage between environmental change and violent conflict  
105 entered mainstream security studies only toward the end of the Cold War. In 1989, nearly ten  
106 academic articles addressing this connection were published, signalling a significant shift in  
107 the discipline (O’ Tuathail, 1996). These developments collectively elevated environmental  
108 change from a scientific concern to a matter of political and societal security.

109 Conceptually, the term “environment” commonly refers to the “natural environment,”  
110 encompassing all components, conditions, and factors that influence the growth and  
111 development of living organisms (Yadav, Alok, 2013). The relationship between ecological  
112 protection and human security involves both normative and practical dimensions, as  
113 environmental deterioration directly affects livelihoods, health, and social stability. This  
114 interdependence is particularly visible in Central Asia, where environmental challenges are  
115 multidimensional and deeply intertwined with socio-economic and political dynamics.  
116 Among the most pressing concerns in the region are water scarcity, radiation hazards, and  
117 waste management, each posing serious threats to human security.

118 The most widely cited example of environmental mismanagement in Central Asia is the Aral  
119 Sea crisis. Over the past half-century, the Aral Sea has shrunk dramatically, leading to severe  
120 ecological, social, economic, and public health consequences (Oral, 2003, p. 5). The  
121 desiccation resulted primarily from the diversion of rivers to support the Soviet Union’s  
122 cotton cultivation strategy. Covering approximately 68,000 square kilometers in 1960, the sea  
123 had reduced to a fraction of its original size by the mid-1990s and was nearing ecological  
124 collapse by 2000. The degradation of this once-vast water body exemplifies how state-driven

125 development policies, when detached from ecological considerations, can generate long-term  
126 regional instability.

127 In response to escalating environmental vulnerabilities, Central Asian states have begun  
128 formulating adaptation and mitigation strategies, particularly in relation to climate change.  
129 National policies increasingly emphasize water resource management, renewable energy  
130 development, and energy efficiency. Kazakhstan, for instance, has set targets to expand its  
131 renewable energy capacity(UNDP Kazakh, 2023), while Uzbekistan is undertaking reforms to  
132 modernize its energy sector and reduce carbon emissions(Dimovska, 2023). These initiatives  
133 reflect growing recognition of climate-related risks and the need for sustainable development  
134 pathways.

135 Regional cooperation has also become central to addressing shared environmental challenges,  
136 especially in managing transboundary water resources critical to regional stability.  
137 International organizations such as UNDP and ADB are actively supporting adaptation and  
138 mitigation projects aimed at strengthening institutional capacity and fostering resilience.  
139 Moreover, Central Asian countries have demonstrated commitment to global climate  
140 governance frameworks. Kazakhstan signed and ratified the Paris Agreement on August 2,  
141 2016, and December 6, 2016, respectively(OECD, 2016), underscoring the region's  
142 engagement with international climate commitments.In addition to state and multilateral  
143 initiatives, several NGOs and INGOs - including the Aga Khan Foundation, Asian  
144 Development Bank, CARE International, Central Asian Climate Information Platform, ECO  
145 Forum of NGOs of Kazakhstan, International Union for Conservation of Nature, the German  
146 Corporation for International Cooperation, Oxfam, and the Regional Environmental Centre  
147 for Central Asia - play an instrumental role in advancing environmental awareness, capacity-  
148 building, and policy implementation across the region. Collectively, the literature underscores  
149 that environmental governance in Central Asia remains closely linked to broader questions of  
150 institutional capacity, regional cooperation, and human security.

151

152 Although substantial scholarship exists on post-Soviet environmental governance, important  
153 analytical gaps remain. In particular, limited attention has been paid to examining  
154 institutional deficiencies and policy failures in the specific context of Central Asian states.  
155 While individual country-based studies are available, there is a noticeable shortage of  
156 comparative research exploring how these states interact and address shared environmental

157 challenges collectively. The absence of a region-wide, comparative framework highlights the  
158 need for focused research to bridge these gaps and strengthen understanding of governance  
159 dynamics in Central Asia.

## 160 **Research Questions**

- 161 1. How did the Soviet environmental legacy shape post-independence governance  
162 structures?
- 163 2. What institutional gaps hinder effective environmental policy implementation?
- 164 3. How does environmental degradation intersect with regional security and conflict  
165 risks?

## 166 **Hypothesis**

167 Weak institutional coordination and fragmented policy frameworks in post-Soviet Central  
168 Asia have exacerbated environmental degradation and heightened environmental security  
169 risks.

## 170 **Research Methodology**

171 This study adopts a mixed-methods research design combining quantitative and qualitative  
172 approaches to examine institutional gaps and policy failures in post-Soviet environmental  
173 governance in Central Asia. The quantitative component draws on official environmental  
174 statistics, national legislation, and policy documents from the Central Asian states to identify  
175 trends in water stress, climate vulnerability, pollution levels, and resource management.  
176 Descriptive statistics and comparative analysis are employed to assess cross-country  
177 variations and institutional performance since independence. The qualitative component  
178 involves systematic document and policy analysis of environmental laws, interstate water  
179 agreements, government strategies, and regional cooperation frameworks. These materials are  
180 interpreted through the lens of environmental governance and environmental security to  
181 evaluate regulatory capacity, enforcement mechanisms, and coordination gaps. Primary  
182 sources include national legal frameworks and governmental reports, while secondary  
183 sources consist of peer-reviewed academic literature, international organization assessments,  
184 and policy analyses. This integrated approach enables a comprehensive evaluation of  
185 structural weaknesses and governance constraints shaping environmental outcomes in post-  
186 Soviet Central Asia.

187 **Result and Analysis**

188 Central Asia's contemporary environmental governance structure cannot be understood  
189 without reference to the Soviet legacy that shaped patterns of resource extraction, centralized  
190 decision-making, and ecological neglect. The Soviet model prioritized large-scale agricultural  
191 expansion, hydroelectric production, and industrial output, often without regard for  
192 ecological sustainability. Water, in particular, was treated as a strategic production input  
193 rather than a shared ecological resource. In this context, the diversion of the Amu Darya and  
194 Syr Darya rivers for cotton monoculture fundamentally altered the hydrological balance of  
195 the Aral Sea basin, initiating one of the gravest environmental crises of the twentieth century  
196 (Oral, 2003, p. 5).

197 After independence, the dissolution of the centralized *Ministry of Land Reclamation and*  
198 *Water Resources* (Minvodkhoz) in Moscow transferred water management responsibilities to  
199 newly sovereign but institutionally fragile states. Although regional mechanisms were created  
200 to negotiate annual water allocations at the presidential level, micro-level reforms remained  
201 limited. In many cases, Soviet-era practices such as the "use it or lose it" allocation principle  
202 continued in the absence of effective sanctions or conservation incentives. This institutional  
203 fragmentation directly validates the hypothesis that weak coordination and disjointed policy  
204 frameworks have intensified environmental degradation and increased environmental security  
205 risks.

206 The Aral Sea's shrinkage - from 68,000 square kilometres (approximately the size of Odisha,  
207 an India State) in 1960 to nearly one-tenth of its size by the mid-1990s - illustrates how  
208 inherited production priorities combined with post-Soviet economic nationalism undermined  
209 ecological sustainability. The resulting Aralkum desert now emits approximately 755 million  
210 tonnes of toxic dust annually, spreading pollutants across the Pamir and Tien Shan mountains  
211 and beyond. Soil salinity, biodiversity loss, declining agricultural productivity, and public  
212 health crises demonstrate how environmental degradation intersects with socio-economic  
213 instability. The environmental crisis is therefore not merely ecological but structural, linking  
214 poverty, governance deficits, and regional tension.

215 Climate change has further intensified vulnerabilities. Glacial retreat in Kazakhstan and  
216 neighbouring Central Asian countries reduced ice reserves by more than one-third between  
217 1956 and 1990 and continues at an annual rate of 0.6-0.8 percent. Since glacial meltwater  
218 contributes roughly 25 percent of annual river runoff, continued decline threatens long-term

219 water security. In a region marked by demographic growth and irrigation dependence, such  
220 hydrological uncertainty increases the risk of inter-state friction. The evidence thus confirms  
221 that environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and governance gaps collectively heighten  
222 environmental security concerns. Regional and international efforts, including the  
223 Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC-2002) and subsequent coordination meetings  
224 in Bishkek (OSCE, 2017, p. 16), indicate growing recognition of shared vulnerability.  
225 However, while institutional architecture has expanded, implementation gaps persist across  
226 national contexts.

227 Kazakhstan represents both the most institutionally developed and environmentally burdened  
228 state in Central Asia. Soviet policies, including the *Virgin Land Program* initiated in 1953,  
229 converted nearly 60 percent of pastures into cropland, much of it ecologically unsuitable. By  
230 1992, although 36.5 million hectares were cultivated, only 2.3 million hectares were irrigated,  
231 exposing structural inefficiencies (AllRefer, 2016). These historical interventions contributed  
232 to soil erosion, desertification, and water stress. The Aral Sea catastrophe particularly affected  
233 Kazakhstan's northern regions. By 2007, the water surface had declined by nearly 90  
234 percent (Nugumanova, 2017, p. 4). The construction of the Kokaral Dam in 2005 partially  
235 restored the North Aral Sea, reviving limited fishing activities and providing modest  
236 livelihood recovery. Nonetheless, broader basin-level degradation remains  
237 unresolved. Kazakhstan also inherited extensive radioactive contamination from the  
238 Semipalatinsk Nuclear Testing Polygon, established in 1947. Between 1949 and 1989, 470  
239 nuclear tests were conducted, releasing contamination across 19 million acres (UNDPKAZ,  
240 2004, p. 54). Cancer rates in the region tripled between 1980 and 1990, with lung and  
241 esophageal cancer mortality increasing significantly (Karimova, 2018, p. 1422). These figures  
242 demonstrate how Soviet-era militarization generated enduring health and ecological  
243 consequences.

244 Institutionally, Kazakhstan has developed an extensive legal framework. Article 31 of the  
245 1995 Constitution obliges the state to protect an environment favourable to life and  
246 health (UNDPKAZ, 2004, p. 20). The Law on Environmental Protection (1997), the  
247 Environmental Code, 2007 (amended 62 times between 2007-2017), and the Emissions  
248 Trading Scheme administered by the Department of Climate Change reflect advanced  
249 legislative capacity (UNECE, 2019, p. 15), (Nugumanova L. &, 2017). Kazakhstan was also  
250 among the first post-Soviet states to ratify the UNFCCC and introduce carbon market  
251 mechanisms. Yet frequent institutional restructuring - including the abolition of the *Ministry*

252 of *Environmental Protection* in 2014 and the transfer of responsibilities to the *Ministry of*  
253 *Energy* - illustrates governance volatility. Despite legal sophistication, enforcement deficits  
254 and bureaucratic overlap constrain effective implementation. Thus, Kazakhstan confirms the  
255 hypothesis: institutional complexity without coherent coordination perpetuates environmental  
256 risk.

257 Kyrgyzstan's environmental governance reflects both vulnerability and adaptive  
258 experimentation. As an upstream state dependent on glacial meltwater, it faces acute climate  
259 sensitivity. The degradation of mountain glaciation threatens hydroelectric production and  
260 irrigation stability. Unlike some regional counterparts, Kyrgyzstan pursued decentralization  
261 through the Law on Pasture (2009), transferring rangeland management to community-based  
262 pasture committees (Wang, 2020, p. 2501), (Hughes, 2012, p. 11). This reform sought to  
263 correct Soviet-era overgrazing patterns and enhance local stewardship. Complementary  
264 frameworks such as the *National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy* (2015; updated 2020)  
265 and the *Green Economy Development Strategy* (2019) institutionalized climate  
266 planning (Bychkova, 2023, p. 152).

267 The establishment of the *Climate Change Coordination Commission* in 2012 improved inter-  
268 sectoral oversight (PAGE, 2019, p. 20). Civil society organizations, including the UNISON  
269 foundation, have strengthened community participation. However, fiscal constraints, limited  
270 administrative capacity, and dependence on external funding restrict policy  
271 continuity. Kyrgyzstan's experience suggests that decentralization can enhance responsiveness  
272 but requires robust coordination and sustained financial support. The persistence of glacier  
273 retreat and water-sharing tensions underscores the structural link between environmental  
274 vulnerability and regional security.

275 Tajikistan, another upstream country, relies heavily on glacial runoff for hydropower and  
276 agriculture. National communications to the UNFCCC (2003, 2008, 2014) and the *National*  
277 *Strategy for Climate Resilience* (2019) reflect formal commitment to adaptation (Khakimov,  
278 2020, p. 7) (Scissa, 2024, p. 52). Institutionally, climate governance is shared among the  
279 *Executive Office of the President*, the *Committee for Environmental Protection*, and the  
280 *Agency on Hydrometeorology* (OSCE, 2017, p. 53). While this multi-actor approach broadens  
281 participation, it also risks fragmentation.

282 Frequent floods, landslides, and glacial lake outburst events expose communities to  
283 compounded environmental threats. Poverty amplifies vulnerability, and adaptation measures

284 often depend on donor-supported initiatives. Tajikistan therefore exemplifies how limited  
285 institutional capacity constrains the operationalization of environmental strategies,  
286 reinforcing the central hypothesis.

287 Uzbekistan, as a downstream state heavily dependent on irrigation for cotton, bears  
288 substantial responsibility for Aral Sea depletion. Water diversion policies during the Soviet  
289 period entrenched monoculture dependence. The resulting desertification and salinization  
290 have severely degraded agricultural productivity. Recent reforms signal a shift. Ratification of  
291 the *Paris Agreement* (2018), the *Environmental Protection Concept* (2019), and the *Green*  
292 *Economy Development Strategy* (2019) outline sustainability commitments. *Presidential*  
293 *Decree No. PP-436 of December, 2022*, operationalizes measurable green growth  
294 targets (World Bank Group, 2023, p. 18). Initiatives such as Yashil Makon and large-scale  
295 renewable energy investments demonstrate policy ambition (Bychkova, 2023, p.  
296 112), (Nematov, 2025).

297 However, implementation remains challenged by irrigation inefficiency, institutional  
298 centralization, and rural vulnerability. Media narratives and international finance mobilization  
299 have increased public engagement, yet structural water dependence persists. Uzbekistan's  
300 trajectory illustrates incremental institutional reform within an inherited resource-intensive  
301 model.

302 Turkmenistan's governance model remains highly centralized. The *National Climate Change*  
303 *Strategy* and afforestation drive under the *National Forestry Programme* (since 2013) reflect  
304 symbolic commitment. Its participation in Rio+20 and international forums indicate  
305 diplomatic engagement (OSCE, 2017, p. 57). Nevertheless, expanded gas production has  
306 elevated emissions, and irrigation inefficiencies continue to strain water resources. Limited  
307 transparency and civil society engagement restrict policy accountability. While political  
308 stability is relatively high, environmental governance remains state-centric, reinforcing  
309 regional fragmentation.

## 310 **Policy Recommendations**

- 311 1. Establish a binding, rules-based transboundary water framework with enforceable  
312 compliance mechanisms.
- 313 2. Clarify mandates among ministries and integrate water, energy, and agriculture  
314 policies.

- 315 3. Scale up community-based resource management models, especially in irrigation and  
316 pasture systems.
- 317 4. Prioritize glacier monitoring, water-saving irrigation technologies, and drought-  
318 resilient crops.
- 319 5. Institutionalize access to environmental information and strengthen civil society  
320 oversight.
- 321 6. Integrate environmental risk assessments into regional security cooperation  
322 frameworks.

### 323 **Conclusion**

324 The findings confirm that Soviet environmental legacies structured centralized extraction-  
325 oriented governance. Post-independence fragmentation, inconsistent decentralization, and  
326 weak enforcement mechanisms have hindered effective implementation. While legal and  
327 institutional reforms are evident across the region, coordination deficits  
328 persist. Environmental degradation - manifested in water scarcity, glacial retreat,  
329 desertification, and radioactive contamination - intersects directly with socio-economic  
330 vulnerability and regional security. The hypothesis that weak institutional coordination and  
331 fragmented policy frameworks exacerbate environmental degradation and heighten security  
332 risk is therefore substantiated.

333 Central Asia's environmental governance trajectory reveals a complex interplay between  
334 inherited structural legacies and contemporary institutional fragmentation. Addressing these  
335 systemic weaknesses is essential not only for ecological sustainability but also for regional  
336 peace and human security.

337

338

339

340

341

342

343

344  
345  
346  
347  
348  
349  
350  
351  
352  
353  
354  
355  
356  
357  
358  
359  
360  
361  
362  
363  
364  
365  
366  
367  
368  
369

**References (\*indicate primary sources)**

AllRefer (2016, March). Kazakhstan: Agriculture in Kazakhstan, Kazakhstani Information Resource. Retrieved from AllRefer.com: <http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/kazakhstan/kazakhstan33.html>

Bychkova, A. (2023, September). Understanding Climate Change Narratives in Central Asia: The Power Dynamics in Vulnerable States. Department of Politics and International Relations, Nottingham Trent University. Retrieved April 28, 2025, from <https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/51624/1/Alina%20Bychkova%202023.pdf>

Dimovska, M. (2023). *Meeting Uzbekistan's climate goals while lighting homes and powering industry*. United Nations Development Programme. Retrieved from <https://www.undp.org/uzbekistan/blog/meeting-uzbekistans-climate-goals-while-lighting-homes-and-powering-industry>

Karimova, B. Z. (2018). Ecological Problems in Mass Media in Kazakhstan. *Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences & Research*, 10(6), 1422-1427. Retrieved from <https://www.jpsr.pharmainfo.in/Documents/Volumes/vol10Issue06/jpsr10061823.pdf>

Khakimov, P. A. (2020). Climate Change Effects on Agriculture and Food Security in Tajikistan. *SilkRoad: A Journal of Eurasian Development*, 2(1), 1-21. doi:<https://doi.org/10.16997/srjed.33>

- 370 Kumar, D. H. (2015). Geopolitics and Great Powers in Central Asia. Retrieved from  
371 [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/390985314\\_Geopolitics\\_and\\_Great\\_Powers](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/390985314_Geopolitics_and_Great_Powers_in_Central_Asia)  
372 [in Central Asia](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/390985314_Geopolitics_and_Great_Powers_in_Central_Asia)
- 373 Kumar, D. H. (2023). Central Asia's Security: A study of Great Powers, Bilateral Treaties and  
374 Regional Organizations. *NIU International Journal of Human Rights*, 10(III), 115-  
375 128. Retrieved from  
376 [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/372110443\\_Central\\_Asia's\\_Security\\_A\\_stu](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/372110443_Central_Asia's_Security_A_study_of_Great_Powers_Bilateral_Treaties_and_Regional_Organizations)  
377 [dy\\_of\\_Great\\_Powers\\_Bilateral\\_Treaties\\_and\\_Regional\\_Organizations](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/372110443_Central_Asia's_Security_A_study_of_Great_Powers_Bilateral_Treaties_and_Regional_Organizations)
- 378 Kumar, H. (2021). Traditional and Non-Traditional Threats in Central Asian Republics.  
379 *Journal of Education: Rabindra Bharati University*, XXIII(9), 86-93. Retrieved from  
380 [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/390980175\\_TRADITIONAL\\_AND\\_NON-](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/390980175_TRADITIONAL_AND_NON-TRADITIONAL_THREATS_IN_CENTRAL_ASIAN_REPUBLICS)  
381 [TRADITIONAL\\_THREATS\\_IN\\_CENTRAL\\_ASIAN\\_REPUBLICS](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/390980175_TRADITIONAL_AND_NON-TRADITIONAL_THREATS_IN_CENTRAL_ASIAN_REPUBLICS)
- 382 Kumar, H. (2024). Democratic Process and Political Process in Central Asian States. *Central*  
383 *Asia and the Caucasus*, 25(1), 1-14. Retrieved from  
384 [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/391279315\\_DEMOCRATIC\\_PROCESS\\_A](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/391279315_DEMOCRATIC_PROCESS_AND_POLITICAL_CULTURE_IN_CENTRAL_ASIAN_STATES)  
385 [ND\\_POLITICAL\\_CULTURE\\_IN\\_CENTRAL\\_ASIAN\\_STATES](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/391279315_DEMOCRATIC_PROCESS_AND_POLITICAL_CULTURE_IN_CENTRAL_ASIAN_STATES)
- 386 Matthew, A. Richard et al. (2010). *Global Environmental Change and Human Security*.  
387 London: The MIT Press. Retrieved from [http://mitp-content-](http://mitp-content-server.mit.edu:18180/books/content/sectbyfn?collid=books_pres_0&id=8210&fn=9780262513081_sch_0001.pdf)  
388 [server.mit.edu:18180/books/content/sectbyfn?collid=books\\_pres\\_0&id=8210&fn=97](http://mitp-content-server.mit.edu:18180/books/content/sectbyfn?collid=books_pres_0&id=8210&fn=9780262513081_sch_0001.pdf)  
389 [80262513081\\_sch\\_0001.pdf](http://mitp-content-server.mit.edu:18180/books/content/sectbyfn?collid=books_pres_0&id=8210&fn=9780262513081_sch_0001.pdf)
- 390 Nematov, A. (2025, April 3). Euroviews. Central Asia at the forefront of the fight against  
391 climate change and Uzbekistan's regional policy. Retrieved August 10, 2025, from  
392 [https://www.euronews.com/2025/04/03/central-asia-at-the-forefront-of-the-fight-](https://www.euronews.com/2025/04/03/central-asia-at-the-forefront-of-the-fight-against-climate-change-and-uzbekistans-regional)  
393 [against-climate-change-and-uzbekistans-regional](https://www.euronews.com/2025/04/03/central-asia-at-the-forefront-of-the-fight-against-climate-change-and-uzbekistans-regional)
- 394 Nugumanova, L. a. (2017, May). Environmental governance and policy in Kazakhstan. *IOS*  
395 *Working Papers*. Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies. Retrieved  
396 from <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/162149/1/889792119.pdf>
- 397 O' Tuathail, G. (1996). *Critical geopolitics*. London: Routledge.
- 398 \*OECD. (2016). *Multi-dimensional Review of Kazakhstan: Volume 1. Initial Assessment*.  
399 OECD Development Pathways. Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from

400 [https://www.oecd.org/publications/multi-dimensional-review-of-kazakhstan-](https://www.oecd.org/publications/multi-dimensional-review-of-kazakhstan-9789264246768-en.htm)  
401 [9789264246768-en.htm](https://www.oecd.org/publications/multi-dimensional-review-of-kazakhstan-9789264246768-en.htm)

402 Oral, A. A. (2003, March 18). Health and Ecological Consequences of the Aral Sea Crisis.  
403 *Regional Cooperation in Shared Water Resources in Central Asia*. Kyoto. Retrieved  
404 from [http://www.caee.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/ce385d/papers/atanizaova\\_wwf3.pdf](http://www.caee.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/ce385d/papers/atanizaova_wwf3.pdf)

405 \*OSCE. (2017). *Climate Change and Security in Central Asia - Regional Assessment Report*.  
406 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Retrieved June 30, 2025, from  
407 <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/355471>

408 \*PAGE. (2019). *The Kyrgyz Republic: Green Industry and Trade Assessment (GITA)*.  
409 Partnership for Action on Green Economy, United Nations Industrial Development  
410 Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2025, from [https://www.un-](https://www.un-page.org/static/65bf5ebc9e71e3e381447cdbab3b0931/2019-kyrgyz-republic-green-industry-trade-assessment-kyrgyzstan-unido-page.pdf)  
411 [page.org/static/65bf5ebc9e71e3e381447cdbab3b0931/2019-kyrgyz-republic-green-](https://www.un-page.org/static/65bf5ebc9e71e3e381447cdbab3b0931/2019-kyrgyz-republic-green-industry-trade-assessment-kyrgyzstan-unido-page.pdf)  
412 [industry-trade-assessment-kyrgyzstan-unido-page.pdf](https://www.un-page.org/static/65bf5ebc9e71e3e381447cdbab3b0931/2019-kyrgyz-republic-green-industry-trade-assessment-kyrgyzstan-unido-page.pdf)

413 Scissa, C. a. (2024). *Migration in the Context of Climate and Environmental Changes within*  
414 *Central Asia and to the European Union and the Russian Federation*. Geneva:  
415 International Organization for Migration. Retrieved July 12, 2025, from  
416 [https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11411/files/documents/2024](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11411/files/documents/2024-05/pub2023-041-el-migration-in-the-context-of-climate-ca-eu-rf_0.pdf)  
417 [-05/pub2023-041-el-migration-in-the-context-of-climate-ca-eu-rf\\_0.pdf](https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11411/files/documents/2024-05/pub2023-041-el-migration-in-the-context-of-climate-ca-eu-rf_0.pdf)

418 \*UNDPKAZ. (2004). *Environment and Development Nexus in Kazakhstan*. A series of  
419 UNDP publication in Kazakhstan. Almaty: LEM Printhouse. Retrieved from  
420 <https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/ncsa-documents/2147-22347.pdf>

421 \*UNECE. (2019). *Environmental Performance Reviews: Kazakhstan*. United Nations  
422 Economic Commission for Europe. New York and Geneva: United Nations. Retrieved  
423 from  
424 [https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/epr/epr\\_studies/ECE\\_CEP\\_185\\_Eng.pdf](https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/epr/epr_studies/ECE_CEP_185_Eng.pdf)

425 Wang, Y. Y. (2020). Recent responses of grassland net primary productivity to climatic and  
426 anthropogenic factors in Kyrgyzstan. *Land Degradation and Development*, 31, 2490-  
427 2506. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1002/ldr.3623>

428 \*World Bank Group. (2023). *Uzbekistan: Country Climate and Development Report*.  
429 Washington: World Bank. Retrieved December 12, 2025, from  
430 <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/40608>

431 Yadav, Alok. (2013). An Empirical Study on Environmental Issues in India. *Global Journal*  
432 *of Management and Business Studies*, 3(9), 949-954. Retrieved from  
433 [https://www.ripublication.com/gjmbs\\_spl/gjmbsv3n9\\_03.pdf](https://www.ripublication.com/gjmbs_spl/gjmbsv3n9_03.pdf)

434

435

436

437

438

439

UNDER PEER REVIEW IN IJAR